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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

presented the necessary causation evidence, but the trial court
disagreed. Therefore, the reviewing court concluded the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in striking the affidavit and the trial court
properly granted the no-evidence summary judgment motion.
John A. Heifrich
VIRGINIA
Carrv. Kidd, 540 S.E.2d 884 (Va. 2001) (holding an historic mean
water line that is unaltered by man is the appropriate measurement in
the apportionment of riparian rights, and a riparian owner will gain
the right to water frontage unless the grantor of the interest in such
riparian property clearly retains such right for himself or another on
the face of the granting deed).
Plaintiffs, Robert C. and Marjorie B. Kidd, and defendants, the
Mark S. and Lori Crowley, owned adjoining land fronting a cove
located on Tanner's Creek in Norfolk, Virginia. Upon the Crowleys'
objection to the Kidds' desire to construct a pier into the cove, the
Kidds hired Robert L. Taliaferro, a riparian surveyor, to determine
each of the parties' riparian rights. Taliaferro determined the Kidds'
proposed pier was within their riparian rights and the Crowleys
existing pier was encroaching on the Kidds' rights. The Kidds sued
the Crowleys requesting a determination of each of the parties' rights
and claiming trespass.
In response, the Crowleys hired their own surveyor, Robert M.
Kennedy, whose survey results were nearly identical to those of
Taliaferro. The parties reached a tentative settlement that would have
required the Crowleys to remove their current pier and allow
construction of new piers by both parties within their determined
rights.
Upon learning of the pending settlement, Leslie G. Carr and
Janice N. Kohl (collectively, the "Carrs"), neighbors of the Crowleys,
intervened claiming the Kennedy survey incorrectly drew rights across
the Carrs' property.
The trial court referred the matter to a commissioner in chancery
who recommended allocation of riparian rights pursuant to the
Kennedy survey. The commissioner noted in his report that a historic
mean water line, or one unaltered by man-made improvements, is the
appropriate measurement to determine riparian rights. The trial
court affirmed the commissioner's report and entered judgment
accordingly.
On appeal, the Carrs first claimed the commissioner's acceptance
of the Kennedy survey was inappropriate because the survey used an
incorrect mean low water line measurement in determining each of
the parties' riparian rights. Second, the Carrs claimed the source deed
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for both the Kidd and Crowley properties did not contain an express
grant of riparian rights and, therefore, the Kidds and Crowleys had no
legal right to claim riparian rights to their properties.
With respect to the mean water line claim, the supreme court
recognized the Kennedy survey used a mean water line designated in
1908, when the parties' properties were originally platted ("Historic
MWL"). The Carrs claimed the correct measure to determine riparian
rights was the current mean water line ("Current MLW"). The
supreme court stated the general law governing the measurement and
allocation of riparian rights is that any man-made improvements to a
riparian owner's shoreline that alter the location of the shoreline
should be disregarded in a determination of riparian rights, but that
any natural accretion of the shoreline may be considered.
The supreme court recognized evidence before the commissioner
that indicated man-made improvements altered the Carrs' shoreline.
As such, the supreme court concluded the trial court correctly
affirmed the commissioner's decision to use the Kennedy survey that
used the Historic MWL to determine the parties' riparian rights.
With respect to the Carrs' claim that the Kidds and Crowleys were
not granted riparian rights with their land, the supreme court
determined that an owner of riparian land has a right to water
frontage of such riparian land unless the grantor of the land on the
face of the granting deed manifestly retains those rights. The supreme
court held there was no evidence of any severance or retention of the
riparian rights to either the Kidd or the Crowley property in the chains
of title to both of their properties.
Megan Becher-Harris
WASHINGTON
Hsieh v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, No. 19126-5-H, 2001 Wash. App.
TEXIS 3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2001) (affirming dismissal of permit
holders' action, finding the statute of limitations and the doctrine of
laches barred declaratory relief, conversion, and injunction claims,
reversing the judgment awarding attorney fees, and finding the
mortgage was extinguished at the time of foreclosure and the permit
holders' action was not frivolous).
Jack and Dorothy Hsieh ("Hsiehs") had a water permit to
appropriate water from the Columbia River to irrigate their property.
Appellee, State of Washington Department of Ecology, established this
water permit initially when it issued the permit to the Esmieu Trust,
who later assigned the permit to the Hsiehs. In order to secure a loan,
the Hsiehs executed a mortgage to Appellee, John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Co. ("John Hancock"), on the property covered by the
water permit. In 1985, John Hancock foreclosed on the mortgage.
Appellees, J.R. Simplot Co. ("Simplot") and Iowa Beef Processors

